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TRINITY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS: PROBLEMS WITH DISALLOWING PRPs
THAT ENTER INTO STATE CONSENT DECREES FROM BRINGING COSTRECOVER ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA
Michael Trentin

I. INTRODUCTION
In Trinity, a case of first impression, the Third Circuit went against its sister Second
Circuit, creating a split on yet another issue concerning the somewhat infamous Comprehensive
Environmental Reponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

1

Since the Supreme

Court’s holdings in Cooper Industries and Atlantic Research there has been uncertainty in the
CERCLA community about whether a PRP that enters into a consent decree with a state’s
administrative agency has settled its CERCLA liability, thereby qualifying the PRP to bring a
cause of action under § 113(f)(3)(B) for contribution.
On August 20’th 2013, the Trinity Court considered the extent to which a settlement of
state liability for environmental contamination affects the contribution scheme provided by
CERCLA, and whether injunctive relief under RCRA is available when a remediation plan is
underway.

The court held that § 113(f)(3)(B) does not require that a party have settled its

liability under CERCLA to be eligible for contribution.
Therefore, Trinity expands the situations in which a potentially responsible party (“PRP”)
may bring a contribution claim under § 113(f)(b)(3). However, by so doing, it effectively bars a
PRP from bringing a clam under § 107(a). This is because Courts have held that a PRP may not

1

423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 – 9675.
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bring both a claim under § 113(f) and § 107(a).2

Any expansion of the scope of one of the

provisions effectively eliminates the party’s ability to bring a claim under the other. Therefore,
by expanding the scope of § 113(f), Trinity limits a PRP’s claim for contribution and effectively
eliminates an otherwise viable (and often preferred) § 107(a) claim.
Such a result is inequitable and runs counter to one of the main goals of CERLCA, to
“assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous
conditions presented.” A cooperating party should not lose its ability to bring a § 107(a) claim
merely because it has “settled” its State liability.

The Second Circuit got it right by recognizing

that allowing a § 107(a) claim despite the party entering into a consent order with a state, creates
a stronger incentive for PRPs to cooperate with state agencies and discourages expensive and
prolonged litigation. In Trinity, the Court avoided these practical issues.

Instead, it based its

holding on the theory that a settlement of a state law claim precludes a PRP from being
vulnerable under CERCLA.

While this holding may seem PRP friendly, it is in fact only

friendly to those PRP’s who would otherwise and rightfully have greater liability under § 107(a)
but are able to avoid such a claim merely because another PRP had “settled” with the state. Of
course, the word “settlement” is misleading in the CERCLA context. In the real word, the EPA
or state environmental agency only goes after those PRPs whom they know can front the costs
for the initial cleanup. Afterward, those companies are left to chase smaller PRPs who may be
99% responsible for the contamination. It comes as no surprise that first PRPs rarely are able to
extract contribution from these illusive PRPs. By further denying the first PRP the right to seek
contribution under § 107(a), Trinity effectively cuts another leg out from under these parties, thus
forcing them to bear the costs without being allowed a § 107(a) contribution claim.

2

Infra
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This comment discusses CERCLA from a historical perspective paying special attention
to the evolution of the private causes of action available under CERCLA and the Supreme
Courts’ impact on these provisions.

First, it gives a brief background of the Statute and its

general function. Second, it discusses the historical development of §§ 107(a) and 113(f) and the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Cooper and Atlantic Research. Third, it highlights the advantages
of § 107(a) to § 113(f). Fourth, it discusses the split between the Second and Third Circuits.
Finally, it argues in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach.
II. CERCLA OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. Article 613 was designed to encourage prompt and effective
cleanup of hazardous waste sites.3 CERLCA empowers the federal government and the states to
seek recovery and expenses associated with those cleanups.4 CERLCA is not well known for its
clarity.

The Supreme Court noted that “[c]learly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find

comfort in the world of CERCLA.”5 Despite the statute's shortcomings, however, Congress has
attributed two primary goals to CERCLA: to (1) to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste
sites, and (2) assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible for creating or maintaining the
hazardous conditions presented.6
The most difficult problems with the Statute arise out of its framework for allowing
private parties to bring contribution or cost-recovery actions against other private parties. These
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 – 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) cert. denied,535 U.S.
971, 122 S.Ct. 1437, 152 L.Ed.2d 381 (2002).
5 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (US 1986) (noting CERCLA provisions are “not…model[s] of
legislative draftsmenship,” and its statutory languages is “at best inartful and at worst redundant”); Artesian Water
Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has
been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to is precipitous passage.”)
6 Id. (citing, inter alia, Consol. Edison v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94(2d Cir.2005)).
3
4
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private parties are known as “potentially responsible parties”(“PRPs”). A PRP is a party that has
been identified as being responsible for any portion of the contamination.

A PRP can fall into

any of the broad categories under the statute: (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for In addition, any
identified PRP may be held fully liable for the contamination of an entire site.7

Further, courts

have expanded the list of PRPs to include: successor corporations to generators, transporters or
former owners or operators; lessees of current and former landowners; corporate officers who
were active in site operations; active shareholders; parent corporations; lenders; and trustees. 8
Typically, PRPs are identified by the EPA or other state agencies that investigate
contaminated sites.9

One of the key aspects of CERCLA is that it allows the EPA to bring

enforcement actions against these PRPs in order to induce clean-up. Even though the EPA has
the ability to respond to releases and spills, it generally looks to PRPs to implement removal and
long-term remedial actions.10

7

§ 104(a)(1)
57 A. Jur. Trials 1.
9 57 Am. Jur. Trials 1
10 Id.
8

The EPA reserves several remedial options. 11

Generally, upon

5

discovery and investigation of a site, it will send a “PRP letter,” announcing that the recipient has
been designated a PRP.

12

The EPA then undertakes settlement negotiations with the PRP,

usually to induce the PRP to commence voluntary cleanup of the sites.

13

It comes as no surprise

that the EPA is going to target PRPs who can afford the high cleanup costs, with little regard for
that party’s actual responsibility or contribution to the contamination. This is in fact exactly how
the statute was meant to function so as to further CERCLA’s goals, i.e., to (1) encourage timely
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and (2) assign the cost of such cleanups to those responsible
for creating or maintaining the hazardous conditions presented.

However, in order to meet both

goals, and not just the former, responding PRPs must be given a fair chance to alleviate their
burdens through response actions.
II.

AVAILABLE PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST FELLOW PRPS

A. History
Ever since CERCLA was first enacted, the federal and state governments were permitted
to bring § 107(a) cost recovery actions against PRPs. 14 Cost-recovery actions generally provided
for joint and several liability.15
several liability.

However, CERCLA does not expressly provide for joint and

In fact, references to joint and several liability in the Bill were deleted before

the CERCLA was enacted.16 However, the legislative history indicates that the deletion was not
a repudiation of joint and several liability; rather it was because Congress did not want to
mandate joint and several liability in every instance. 17 In Chem-Dyne Corp., the court ruled that
defendants are subject to joint and several liability under 107(a) unless they can show that the
11

See 40 C.F.R. 300.68(j)
57 Am. Jur. Trials 1
13 Id.
14 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2006)
15 See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009)
16 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 806 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (discussing legislative history of CERCLA)
17 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045,
1052 (2011)
12
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harm is divisible.18

Accordingly, Courts imposed joint and several liability unless the defendant

satisfied the heavy burden showing that the harm is divisible or that there was a reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of its cause to the entire harm.

19

On the other hand, the rights of private parties were unclear.20 In the early 1980s, Most
Courts allowed for a PRP to bring an implied cause of action for contribution against other
PRPs.21

Other courts disallowed such claims in light of the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow

implied rights of action in other Statutes.22 In response, Congress stepped in, and as part of
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Congress added an express
contribution provision to confirm the right of PRPs to bring a contribution action against other
PRPs.
§ 113(f)(1) expressly creates a contribution right for parties liable or potentially liable
under CERCLA.

§ 113(f)(1) permits private parties to seek contribution during or following a

civil action under § 106 or § 107(a).23 § 113(f)(3)(B) permits private parties to seek contribution
after they have settled their liability with the Government.24

The Statute provides that “in

resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using

18

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L.
1045, 1092 (2011).
19 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1053 (2011)
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle Cnty., 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (finding that the right to
contribution under CERCLA exists as a matter of federal common law); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162, 223-29 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding in part that the right of contribution is implied); Wehner v.
Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding in part that the right of contribution is
implied); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding that Congress intended
issues of contribution to be determined under the federal common law).
22 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045,
1055 (2011)(citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981)(Sherman Act and
Clayton Act); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981) (Equal Pay Act and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); see also Aviall, 543 U.S. 157, 161-62(2004))).
23 § 9613(f)(1)
24 § 9613(f)(3)(B)
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such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.25 § 113(f)(1), unlike § 107(a),
confers upon a court broad discretion in allocating response costs among various PRPs,
permitting consideration of as many or as few factors as deemed appropriate based upon the
totality of the circumstances and the equitable considerations presented. 26 Unfortunately, the
Statute itself does not provide a list of factors to be used by the Court in determining the question
of allocation for contribution costs, authorizing the use of “such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate” to reach a just result. 27 To inform the allocation determination courts
generally find it appropriate to examine certain factors, which under other circumstances might
be deemed more relevant to a liability determination, that are not otherwise considered in light of
CERCLA's creation as a strict liability statute. 28
For example, The Second circuit “has declined to compile a mandatory list of factors for
consideration.29
least.

The lack of uniformity concerning the equitable factors is problematic to say the

Some relief may be found in the legislative history surrounding the enactment of

CERCLA, which references six often cited examples of factors that can inform a proper
allocation calculus; those elements, often referred to as the “Gore factors”, including: (1)
whether a party's contribution to release is distinguishable; 2) the amount of hazardous substance
involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance involved; (4) the degree of
involvement of the person in the manufacture, treatment, transport or disposal of the hazardous
substance; (5) the degree of care taken by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
25

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442 (citing, inter alia, Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 429))
27 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 130.
28 Id.
29 Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F.Supp.2d 330, 352 (N.D.N.Y.2000); see also Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 170
(noting that allocation is an “equitable determination based on the district court's discretionary selection of the
appropriate equitable factors in a given case”); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 429 (“While § 113(f)(1) directs courts
to allocate cleanup costs between responsible parties ‘using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate, it does not limit courts to any particular list of factors. The statute's expansive language instead affords
a district court broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests of justice.”)
26

8

involved; and (6) the degree of cooperation between the party and state, federal, or local
authorities preventing harm to the public health or the environment, including efforts to mitigate
damage after a release occurs. 30 The court is not required to consider all or even most of these
Gore factors, however, when making an equitable allocation under §

113(f); “[t]he court may

consider ‘several factors or a few, depending on the totality of the circumstances and equitable
considerations. ”31
While some courts have considered the Gore factors identified in the legislative history
underpinning CERCLA when allocating response costs, others have found the analysis of Judge
Ernest C. Torres in the United States v. Davis,32 to provide a more “real world” construct for
allocating those expenses, taking into account 1) the extent to which cleanup costs are
attributable to the waste for which the particular parties responsible; 2) the parties' degree of
culpability; 3) the benefit realized by the party from disposal of the waste; and 4) the party's
ability to pay.

33

Despite the problems with equitable distribution described above, § 113(f) was successful
in confirming Congress’s desire to allow for contributions actions.

Also, it was clear that

contribution actions provided only for several rather than § 107(a) joint and several liability.
However, there was still a problem. Following the addition of § 113(f), there was considerable
disagreement over when a private CERCLA plaintiff could bring an action under § 107 rather
than § 113(f).

30

34

Where the federal government sued a PRP under § 107(a) or settled with a PRP

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 130 (citing S.Rep. No. 96–848, at 345–46) (1980)).
Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442 (citing and quoting N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d
96, 104 (3d Cir.1999)).
32 31 F.Supp.2d 45, 63 (D.R.I.1998), aff'd, 261 F.3d 1 (1d Cir. 2001)
33 See Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F.Supp.2d at 442.
34 E.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Sun Co.
v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1192-94 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting section 107 imposes joint and several
liability while section 113 imposes several liability); Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 414-15 (contrasting section 107 and
section 113 claims).
31

9

under § 113(f)(3)(B), it was clear that the PRPs only cause of action was for contribution under §
113(f).35

As one commenter noted, however, some savy responsible parties, rather than waiting

for the government to perform clean-up and then be sued, had begun voluntarily cleaning up
contaminated sites for which they were subject to liability. 36
The question then became whether these pre-PRPs could bring suit for cost recovery
under § 107(a), and thus attaint the joint and several benefits of § 107(a), or were these parties
still confined to recovery under § 113(f).

Defendants argued that private parties should be

limited to claims under § 113(f), for which defendants would only be severally liable. 37
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that their costs were incurred “voluntarily” and therefore,
they should be allowed the benefits under § 107(a).38
By the late 1990s, however, virtually all of the circuits had addressed the issue and
unanimously had held that a PRP plaintiff was limited to suing under § 113 and cannot maintain
an action under section 107(a).39

The primary reasoning behind these holdings was that a PRP

should not be entitled to the advantage under 107(a), merely because they anticipated suit and
acted early in order to preserve a 107(a) claim. 40 Other reasons were that allowing responsible
party plaintiffs to sue under section 107 would circumvent the contribution protection afforded
by § 113(f)(2) to parties who settle with the government and would provide them with more
favorable statutes of limitations under 42 U.S.C. §9613(g). 41

35

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 20 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D.R.I. 1998), aff'd in part, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2001); United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. 592, 601 (D.N.J. 1997)
36 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045,
1057 (2011)
37 See New Castle Cnty v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 11 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997)
38 See, e.g, Centerior Serv. Co., 153 F.3d at 349-350.
39 Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045,
1057 (2011)
40 See Morrison Enters. v. McShares , Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2002); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at
424; Centerior Serv., 153 F.3d at 349-50; New Castle Cnty., 111 F.3d at 1121-22.
41 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1092 (2011)
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B. The Supreme Court Steps In
The Supreme Court upset the unanimity of the Circuits by reversing the Fifth Circuit in
Cooper Industries. In that case, Cooper owned and operated four contaminated aircraft engine
maintenance cites before selling then to Aviall in 1981. 42 Some years later, Aviall discovered that
both it and Cooper had contaminated the facilities when oil and other hazardous substances
leaked into the groundwater.43

Aviall notified the Texas Natural Resource Conservation

Commission (the “Commission”) of the contamination. 44 The Commission directed Aviall to
clean-up the site and threatened to pursue an enforcement action but took no judicial or
administrative measures to compel cleanup. 45

Aviall cleaned-up the properties under the state’s

supervision and incurred approximately $5 million in clean-up costs.46

Aviall then brought suit

against Cooper under § § 113(f)(1), 107(a), and state law.47 Aviall then amended its complaint
to combine the §§ 113(f)(1) and 107(a) claims into a single § 113(f) claim.48
The question on appeal was whether Cooper had standing to bring a § 113(f)(1) claim.49
The Court held that only PRPs that were sued under §§ 106 or 107, or had been party to an
administrative or judicial settlement could rightfully bring a cause of action under § 113(f).50 In
reaching this holding, the Court relied solely on the plain language of § 113(f)(1).51 The court
expressly refused to look at the legislative history or policy implications of its holding. 52

42

Also,

Cooper Industries Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004)
Id. at 163 – 64.
44 Id at 164.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Cooper, 543 U.S. at 164.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 164-65
50 Id. at 165.
51 Id at 166 -67.
52 Id. at 167(“Given the clear meaning of the text, there is no need to resolve this dispute or to consult the purposes
of CERCLA at all.”)
43
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despite the Dissent’s advice, the Majority refused to address whether Cooper was entitled to a §
107(a) claim after being denied a claim under § 113(f).53
This holding shocked the CERCLA community and had result of discouraging PRP
settlement.54

Not only did the majority refuse to grant Aviall a cost-recovery action, but it also

left Aviall with no remedy because it refused to decide the § 107(a) issue. Thus, post-Cooper, “a
responsible party who voluntarily cleaned up a site could be left shouldering the entire cleanup
cost burden, without a CERCLA remedy against other potentially responsible parties under
either section 107 or 113.”55
In 2007, the Supreme Court attempted in to clean-up the Cooper mess with its decision in
Atlantic Research.

In that case, Atlantic leased a research facility from the United States

Department of Defense where Atlantic retrofitted rocket motors for the United States. 56 The
work resulted in the contamination of soil and ground water at the site. 57

Atlantic cleaned the

site at its own expense and then sought to recover some of the costs from the United States under
§§ 113(f) and 107(a).

58

After Cooper was decided, however, Atlantic was forced to amend its

complaint and to seek relief under solely under § 107(a) and the common law.59
Court then granted the United State’s motion to dismiss relying upon Cooper.60

The District
The Court of

Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed, recognizing that Cooper undermined the reasoning of the

53

Cooper, 543 U.S. at 168.
See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167-68; Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1062 (2011) (“Aviall stunned the regulated
community, causing widespread uncertainty about whether PRPs could recover voluntarily incurred cleanup costs
from other PRPs.”); Jeffrey M. Gaba, United States v. Atlantic Research: The Supreme Court Almost Gets It Right ,
37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,810, 10,812 (2007) (“[Aviall] rocked the established view of CERCLA.”)
55 Kenneth K. Kilbert, 41 Envtl. L. 1045, 1062 (2011)
56 Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 133.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 134.
54
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Circuit’s prior precedent.

61

The court reasoned that § 107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any

person other than the persons permitted to sue under § 107(a)(4)(A).62 Accordingly, it held that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action to Atlantic Research. 63 It reasoned that PRPs that “have
been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use § 113, thereby
ensuring its continued vitality.”64
The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the perceived conflict predicted by the Court
of Appeals. First, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals allowing Atlantic to bring a cause of
action under 107(a).65 The Court also reasoned that the reference in section 107(a)(4)(B) to “any
other person” included parties like Atlantic, who are responsible for a portion of the liability but
who also incurred costs “voluntarily.”66

In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the

Government’s argument that section 107(a)(4)(B) authorizes relief only for “innocent” private
parties.67

Thus, the Court determined that a PRP who may be responsible for part of the

contamination may nonetheless incur voluntary cleanup costs.
Second, the Court addressed issues concerning the “friction” between 107(a) and
113(f).68

Specifically, the Court took notice of the Government’s concerns that (1) “by offering

PRPs a choice between §§ 107(a) and 113(f), effectively allows PRPs to circumvent § 113(f)’s
shorter statute of limitations;” and (2) “PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under § 113(f)
in favor of joint and several liability under § 107(a).”69 The Court only partially addressed these
concerns. It noted that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) provide “clearly distinct remedies” that complement

61

Atlantic Research Corp v. U.S., 459 F.3d 827, 830, n. 4. (8th Cir. 2006)
at 835.
63 Id.
64 Id., at 836–837
65 Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 134.
66 Id. at 135.
67 Id. at 136
68 Id. at 137.
69 Id. at 137 -38.
62 Id.

13

each other by providing causes of action ‘to persons in different procedural circumstances.’”70
“As a result, though eligible to seek contribution under § 113(f)(1), the PRP cannot
simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses under § 107(a).”71
Nonetheless, in a footnote, the Court recognized the looming problem that a party that
enters into a consent decree with the government following suit under CERCLA and performs
cleanup work pursuant to the decree’s terms is neither incurring costs voluntarily nor
reimbursing costs of another.72 The Court declined to “decide whether these compelled costs of
response are recoverable under 113(f), 107(a), or both. 73
By now the reader is probably confused as to the state of the law after Cooper and
Atlantic. To summarize, Cooper decided that a PRP who is not subject to a § 106 or § 107 suite
may not bring a § 113(f) claim. Three years later,

Atlantic held that a PRP who voluntarily

cleans up a site may pursue a cost recovery action under § 107(a). After Atlantic, a majority of
circuits have not allowed a plaintiff to pursue both a 107(a) cost recovery claim when a § 113(f)
contribution claim is available.

74

In Agere, the Third Circuit confronted the issue left open by the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Research, “whether, in addition to § 113(f) claims, plaintiff such as these have § 107(a)
claims for expenses sustained pursuant to a consent decree following a CERCLA suit.”

75

In that

case, the Court was faced with a PRP who neither incurred costs voluntarily, nor were they
Id. at 138 – 39 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir.
2005)
71 Id.
72 Id. at n. 11.
73 Id.
74 See Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir.2012); Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo
Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir.2011); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 608 F.3d 284, 291 n. 19
(5th Cir.2010) (acknowledging, and not disturbing, district court's implicit decision that plaintiff could not pursue
both remedies); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 229 (3d Cir.2010); Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir.2010); ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner,
Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir.2007)
75 Id. at 228.
70
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reimbursed to another party.76 The court recognize a problem with Atlantic Research’s reasoning
that “any fear that PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under § 113(f) in favor of joint and
several liability under § 107(a) is mitigated by the fact that a § 113(f) counterclaim would
necessitate the equitable apportionment of costs among the liable parties, including the PRP that
filed the § 107(a) action.”77

The Court pointed out that plaintiffs that have entered into consent

decress “would be able to recover 100 percent of their own costs…, even though themselves are
actually responsible for…a significant portion of the contamination.”78

Refusing to enforce an

inequitable result, the court held that “costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of §
107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or
settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f).”79
C. The Advantage of § 107 to § 113
Since liability is joint and several under § 107(a), the private party may recoup all
recoverable costs from any responsible party.

In contrast, because liability is merely several

under § 113(f), a PRP may only recoup an equitable share of cleanup and response costs from
other PRPs.

A contribution action is more limited because in determining relative contribution

of the parties in such an action, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances, 80 and the
court will, therefore, have broad discretion in determining how to allocate costs under PRPs.
Moreover, a non-settling party who sues for contribution may finds its equitable share of costs
reduced because, under § 113(f)(2), other parties that do not settle with the government are given
contribution protection from claims by non-settling PRPs.

81

Another major disadvantage of

having to resort to a contribution action instead of a private cost recovery action is that the
76

Id. at 227.
Id. at 228 (internal quotations omitted)
78 Id.
79 Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F. 3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010)
80 Enviornmental Transp. Sys. V. Ensco, Inc., 969 F. 2d. 503 (CA 1992).
81 Amer. Jur.
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statute of limitations for contribution claims is only three years as opposed to a six year period
form cost recovery claims.82
Kenneth K. Kilbert, a commentator, recognized another drastic advantage afforded §
107(a).83 Under § 107(a) orphan shares stay orphan, while under § 113(f), the cost of cleaning
up “orphan shares” of hazardous waste from unidentifiable sources or insolvent parties could be
allocated between the remaining potentially responsible party and settling defendants. 84

The

term “orphan share” refers to the common situation where multiple parties are subject to
CERCLA liability for clean-up costs at a site.85

Some of those PRPs however, may not be

capable of contributing payment because they are insolvent, dead, or defunct.86

This is

especially common because of the large costs associated with cleanup and because CERLA can
impose liability for events that occurred decades ago.

87

After trudging through the complexities of § 107(a) and § 113(f), we are left with two
principals that are important here: (1) § 107(a) and § 113(f) are distinct causes of action that
occur procedurally in different places, and § 107(a) allows for joint and several liability while §
113(f) is limited to contribution recovery from a judgment or settlement; (2) it is advantageous
that a PRP position itself to bring a claim under § 107(a) as opposed to § 113(f). With these
principals in mind, we now turn to the split between the Second and Third Circuits.
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
i.

82

Consolidated Edison

Id.
Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private CERCLA Actions , 41 Envtl. L. 1045,
1069 (2011)
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1047.
83
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In Consolidated Edison, the New York State Department of Conservation (the
“Department”) began investigating gas plants in Westchester. 88

In 2002, Con Ed entered into a

voluntary Cleanup Agreement with the Department to clean up more than 100 sites at which Con
Ed or its predecessors might have formerly owned or operated. 89 Prior to entering the cleanup
agreement, Con Ed sued other PRPs to recoup costs that Con Ed had incurred and would incur in
cleaning up the sites allegedly contaminated by these other PRPs. 90 Con Ed claimed that it has
spent $4 mil and might exceed total spending of over $100 mil.

91

The District Court for the

Southern District of New York granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment rejecting
Con Ed’s claims.

92

The Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Cooper, as limiting a party’s
contribution claims under § 113(f).

93

Specifically, the Court relied on Cooper’s language that

stated “contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely ‘during or
following’ a specified civil action.’”94

The Court read the Legislative History of the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act 1986 (“SARA”) to supports its’ reading of the statute,

95

arguing that “the House Committee Report on Energy and Commerce Accompanying SARA
states that section 113 ‘clarifies and confirms the right of a person held joint and severally liable
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties.”96 (“Because the H.
Report makes “no mention of any intent to meddle with the contribution rules governing
settlement

of non-CERCLA claims…we believe section 113(f)(3)(B) does not permit

Con Ed, 423 F.3d at 92 – 93.
Id. at 93.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Con Ed., 423 F.3d at (Case Synopsis).
93 Id. at 93 – 94 (citing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)).
94 Id. at 95 (quoting Cooper, 543 U.S. at 583) (internal citations omitted) ).
95 Id. at 96.
96 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99 – 253(I) at 79 (1985)).
88
89
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contribution actions based on the resolution of liability for state law – but not CERCLA –
claims.”)97
ii.

W.R. Grace
W.R. Grace can be read in conjunction with the Con Ed’s opinion. In addition, it was one

of the first court opinions to address the issue of consent decrees post-Atlantic Research. It also
goes into a more detailed analysis of the purpose of CERCLA and the practical implications of
the Court’s holding.

In W.R. Grace, a landfill owner sought to recover response costs it incurred

cleaning up a contaminated site in New York. 98 In 1983, the site came under investigation by the
New York State of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”). 99 Thereafter, the DEC entered into a
series of two administrative orders with the owner of the site in which the owner agreed to
perform certain remedial work and to reimburse the DEC for costs of investigation. 100

In

consideration, the DEC promised a release of liability under New York Law for claims related to
the site.101

After spending approximately $1.7 million on remedial activities, the owner sued

Zotos, a fellow PRP, for contribution and cost recovery. 102
The issue addressed on appeal was “whether a potentially responsible party who has
remediated a contaminated site pursuant to an administrative consent order has a cause of action
to pursue necessary associated costs.”103

The Court first held that Grace did not settle its

CERCLA liability by way of its consent order with the State of New York. 104

The Court

reasoned that “the fact that a party enters into a consent order before beginning remediation is of

97

Id.
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Intern., Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009).
99 Id. at 87.
100 Id. at 88 – 87.
101 Id. at 88.
102 Id.
103 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 90.
104 Id. at 91 – 92.
98
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no legal significance with respect to whether or not the party has incurred response costs. 105 The
Court recognizes that Grace sought to “recover costs for remediation it performed itself; it does
not seek to recoup expenses incurred in satisfying a settlement agreement or court judgment.”

106

Instead of focusing on the tedious and ambiguous differences between § 107(a) and §
113(f), the Court instead focused on the facts surrounding the specific actions taken by Grace,
which the Court determined were remedial in nature despite the State Order. 107 The fact is that
by entering into an agreement with the State to investigate and remediate a contaminated site,
Grace “saved the parties and the government litigation costs, and presumably also limited
ongoing contamination by promptly remediating the site.”108

Further, the Court recognizes that

to deny Grace to a § 107(a) claim would be to “discourage parties from entering agreements with
the states to ensure proper cleanup.”109 If Grace had not acted responsibly by entering into the
consent order with the DEC, and instead waited for suit, it would have a cause of action under §
113(f)(1), but that course of action would have occasioned both further contamination and
greater expenses associated with the delay in instituting litigation. 110
iii.

Trinity
In Trinity, the owner of industrial site brought action against former owner, seeking

injunctive and monetary relief from former owner, for remediation of site it was undertaking
pursuant to court order, and asserting claims under CERCLA.

111

The former owner filed a

counter claim for contribution. The environmental site at issue is located at an industrial facility

105

Id.
Id. at 93.
107 Id. at 91(“The Consent Order at issue here does not resolve CERCLA claims that could be brought by the federal
government”)
108 Id. at 94.
109 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 95.
110 Id.
111 Trinity Industries, 735 F.3d at 132.
106
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called the South Plant, located in Pennsylvania. 112
manufactured cars there until 2000.

113

Trinity acquired the property in 1988 and

The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental

Protection (“DEP”) started investigating the site in 2004. 114

In 2006, the DEP initiated

enforcement proceedings against Trinity, which resulted in Trinity entering into an agreement, in
which it pled nolo contender to five counts of unlawful conduct.115

On December 21, 2006

Trinity and the DEP entered into a consent order pursuant to the Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act (“HSCA”) and Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act
(“LRA”).

116

The Consent order names Trinity as a “responsible person” for the release of

hazardous substances at the site, but also “expressly reserves Trinity’s right to pursue its cost
recovery, contribution, and other claims against CB & I.”

117

Trinity’s claims are based on CB & I’s role in causing contamination now under
remediation at the site.

118

Trinity had purchased the plant from MBM, a third party, in 1988,

which had purchased it from CB & I in 1985.119

Trinity alleges that CB & I contaminated

several sections of the site through abrasive blasting and painting, pointing to Deposition of
former CB & I employee.120 Immediately after signing the Consent Order, Trinity filed claims
against CB & I under § 113(f)(3)(B), RCA, and state law, seeking contribution from CB & I for
its share of remediation costs and injunctive relief. 121

112

Id. at 132.
Id.
114 Id. at 133
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Trinity, 735 F.3d at 134.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 134, n.1.
121 Id. at 134.
113

The District Court granted summary
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judgment to CB & I and Trinity appealed.122 The United States filed an amicus brief in support
of Trinity.123
The issue that the Court faced was “whether CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) provides a
contribution claim where a party seeking contribution has settled its state – law liability as
opposed to its liability under CERLCA, and whether injunctive relief pursuant to RCRA Article
107(a)(1)(B) is available where a remediation plan has already been instituted and begun.”124
The District Court relied on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Con Ed, holding that § 113(f)(3)(B)
allows for contribution only for claims brought under CERCLA itself. 125
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals chose to go against the Second Circuits’
holdings for the following reasons: (1) the Statutory Language of § 113(f)(3)(B) “requires only
the existence of a settlement resolving liability to the US or a state ‘for some or all of a response
action;”126 (2)

the Legislative History relied upon by the Second Circuit referred only to §

113(f)(1);127 (3) the “cost recovery and contribution provisions in HSCA are virtually identical to
those in CERLCA.”;128 and (4) Pennsylvania law is constructed to comply with CERCLA.129
Therefore, a resolution of PA Law is a de facto resolution of CERLCA
Because Trinity sought a contribution claim under § 113(f)(3)(B), and only argued for a §
107(a) claim in the alternative the court, in a footnote, declined to address whether Trinity had a
claim under § 107(a).130 Thus, the court refused to address the problems with granting a § 113(f)
claim but not a 107(a) claim.

122

Trinity, 735 F.3d at 134.
Id.
124 Id. at 135.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 136.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 137.
129 Id. at 5 (“accordingly, under PA law, remediation pursuant to the LRA is remediation under CERCLA.”).
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IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The Definition of “resolved his liability” Under the Statute
In Trinity the Courts pay little attention to the actual language in the agreement and
instead focus on the fact that a State has the power to settle Trinity’s CERCLA liability.
Assuming that conclusion is true, that should not be the first inquiry of the problem. First, it is
important to ask whether the Consent Order actually “resolves” the PRP’s CERCLA liability. A
settlement in which a PRP promises to undertake certain remedial measures – that once finished,
are subject to the State’s approval- in exchange for a release of claims is itself not a resolution of
the PRP’s liability.

It is only after the completion of the remediation work that the claims are

actually discharged.

Thus, any actions brought in the interim are not contribution actions within

the meaning of § 113(f). This subtle, but important distinction is articulated in a well thought out
opinion in the Seventh Circuit.131
In Bernstein, the EPA discovered groundwater pollution at a site that posed a
contamination risk to the town’s drinking water.132 The EPA responded with a series of Consent
Orders with identical contractual terms – the 1999 AOC and the 2002 AOC - in which the
respondents promised to undertake substantial remedial action and to reimburse the EPA cleanup
costs.133

In return, the EPA agreed to release their liability but not until such conditions were

met.134 The Court held that only the Consent Orders that were completed and approved by the

131

See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190 (7d Cir. 2012); see also ITT Industries Inc. v. Borgwarner Inc., 506 F.3d
452 (2007).
132 Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 196 – 197.
133 Id. at 197-198
134 Id. at 203 – 204
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EPA constituted a resolution of liability within the meaning of § 113(f)(3)(B).135

However, any

Consent Order issued for work that was “ongoing” and without a notice of EPA approval was not
considered a resolution of liability. Thus, no § 113(f)(3)(B) claim was available.136 What was
available was a § 107(a) claim for response costs incurred according to the national contingency
plan.137

Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the mere signing of a settlement agreement

amounted to a resolution of liability for purposes of the statute. 138 The Court also noted that
recovery under § 107(a) was appropriate even though the parties were “compelled” to incur the
costs because of the government’s actions.139

The Court based its findings on its interpretation

of § 113(f)(B)(3)’s plain language.140 It reasoned that a conditional promise is not a resolution of
liability. The Court called for a “look at the terms of the settlement on a case-by-case basis.”141
Further, the Court discussed policy concerns.

Specifically, the Court addressed the

EPA’s concern that its decision would discourage PRPs incentive to settle with the State because
they will lose the “possibility of obtaining contribution from non-settling parties as soon as a
settlement is executed which incentivizes PRPs to settle in the first place.”

142

The Court points

out a fundamental flaw in this argument – even though a PRP is not entitled to sue a non-settling
PRP under § 113(f)(3)(B), it is entitled to sue under § 107(a) cost recovery action – noting that
“the cost recovery action is subject to a longer statute of limitations, making it arguably the
preferable recovery vehicle for a PRP embarking on what might well be a decode-long cleanup
effort, and thus actually creating a further positive incentive to settle.”143

Id. at 204 – 207
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The same reasoning applied by Bernstein concerning EPA settlements should also apply
to state settlements in Con Ed and Trinity. The Court in Bernstein recognizes two important
facts: (1) clean ups can be very expensive and be drawn out for long periods of time; and (2) §§
107(a) claims are preferred to 113(f) claims. Trinity completely ignores these practical concerns
in favor of a bright line rule – that any agreement with a state constitutes a settlement under §
113(f) – without acknowledging that such a rule would actually discourage settlement.
B. Encouraging Settlement
The Statutory Language is ambiguous with regard to state settlements. As such, it must
be read in a manner that “supports the principal congressional concerns of ensuring that those
responsible promptly clean up and pay for the removal of hazardous waste.”144 Trinity’s reading
of the statute would work against the legislative intent of CERCLA by discouraging responsible
PRP’s for taking immediate remedial action in conjunction with State Agencies.
Actions under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) are substantially unequal.
Court or Congress steps in, they will remain unequal.

And until the Supreme

Under Trinity, the problem of inequality

makes it disadvantageous for a PRP to cooperate with State agencies by entering into consent
decrees. Barring a responsible PRP from being allowed a cause of action under § 107(a) will
discourage willing and capable parties from taking efficient cleanup measures because they will
be effectively admitting liability and will lose their opportunity to prove their lesser degree of
responsibility under the strict and several liability standard set forth under § 107(a). It serves no
purpose for a CERCLA § 113 plaintiff, who stepped forward to cooperate with the statement
government to pay for the cleanup of the site and to shoulder the orphan shares as a matter of law
while recalcitrant defendants are immune from the orphan share burden.
C. Avoiding Uncertainty
144

W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 94.
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Finally, Trinity’s argument that its holding avoids the uncertainty that a PRP faces
settling with a State Government – which the Court correctly asserts will leave the PRP open to
further liability- will actually create more uncertainty with regard to State settlement orders. A
PRP that chooses to enter into an order with the State knows that it is simply resolving its
liability with the State (who may otherwise have asserted a cause of action under CERCLA).
The settlement is not entered into with the intent to relinquish its total liability for the said
contaminated cite. Under the Second Circuits framework, the PRP knows this and still chooses
to enter into the agreement in a good faith attempt to remediate cleanup costs. Trinity’s holding
would place special emphasis on the actual language in the Order, which will “turn on the
semantics of the state program’s title, which will undoubtedly vary from state to state and be
subject to internal state modifications.”145
V.

CONLCUSION
The Trinity Court failed to address some of the practical implications of barring PRPs

from bringing cost recovery actions merely because they have entered into a consent order with
state agencies. Thus, its holding takes away an important remedy from responsible PRPs. As a
result, it works to discourage cooperation between PRPs and state agency in an effort to pursue
effective remediation.

145
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